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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN
WEST INDIAN LABOUR LAW
CHUKS OKPALUBA*
INTRODUCTION
The right of the individual worker to join a trade union or to col-
laborate with other employees or other persons in forming a trade union
has been existent, albeit sub-silentio, in the Commonwealth Caribbean
labour law since the Caribbean trade unions were accorded legal recog-
nition during the first half of this century. As it has been pointed out,'
although the Trade Unions Acts brought about the legalisation of trade
unions in the Caribbean, they left unanswered questions which arise from
the practice of trade unionism and, for the present purpose, they did not
state explicitly that the worker has the right to join a trade union. But
by removing the legal disabilities2 which abound in workers' organisations
in the history of trade unionism in the Caribbean, the worker's right to
freely associate existed merely by implication. Since the right was not
expressed in the Acts, it is then understandable that no protection was
afforded the worker in the exercise of the said freedom. One clear instance
of the existence of such right however, is the fact that organisations of
workers always obtained registration as trade unions on satisfaction of the
statutory requirements. 3 Freedom of association and, especially, to form
or to belong to a trade union is now articulated- along with the other
guaranteed freedoms4 -in both the independences and quasi independ-
ence 6 Constitutions of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries. The mean-
ing of this guarantee remains, to a great extent, hidden in the maze of
decided cases discussed below. Quite recently, legislation has been passed
in various Caribbean countries and elsewhere expounding the concept of
freedom of association and clarifying it further. This article explores the
implications of these recent provisions.
*Lecturer in Labour Law, University of the West Indies, Barbados.
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CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE
With the advent of written constitutions in the Commonwealth
Caribbean countries guaranteeing the individual freedom of association,
the question which is bound to arise in view of the brevity with which
the constitutional provisions have been expressed is: what exactly does
this freedom encompass? In effect, from the point of view of a trade
unionist, what innovations has this entrenched freedom -brought about?
In other words, does it contemplate the freedom of every employee to be
unionised and having -been so unionised to be represented by that union?
Assuming that the question is answered in the affirmative, does the
freedom entail that the employer must recognise that particular union?
Phrased in another way, as a result of this guarantee, does its enjoyment
carry a corresponding obligation on the employer to recognise that union
and then to bargain with it? Furthermore, is there anything left of the
freedom of association if it does not imply the right to strike? All these
points have arisen in recent times in Caribbean labour relations law. 7
Accordingly, they are discussed below.
1. Representation by Union of One's Choice
In the first instance, a group of employees in a Jamaican Sugar
Estate finding themselves receiving no wage increases over a number of
years and having no established machinery to process their employment
grievances decided to form a trade union. Consequently, after duly regis-
tering the association, they sought recognition by the employer. The
association, Sugar Industry Clerical and Technical Association (SICTA),
was intended to represent Clerical Workers, Bookkeepers, Stenographers,
Typists, Accounting Machine Operators, Sugar Boilers, Rum Distillers,
Overseers, Factory Foremen, Laboratory Workers, Garage Foremen and
weekly paid chauffeurs.8 Among other reasons which the employers gave
for refusing to recognise the Association was that the Company was "not
prepared to agree that any clerical, administrative, or supervisory em-
ployees on the staff of 'this Company should be represented 'by any trade
union". 9 Before a Board of Enquiry headed by a former Chief Justice of
Jamaica, Sir Colin MacGregor, the Company argued that these employees
were not entitled to be represented by the Association for the following
reasons:
(a) They formed part of the staff of the Company, and as such
occupied positions that were managerial or administrative or
supervisory or confidential, and were regarded by the Company,
as an integral part of management;
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(b) a member of a Trade Union owed loyalty to his Trade Union,
and if and when management and the Trade Union were in
conflict, a member of the staff would be faced with divided
loyalties impossible to reconcile in many such cases;
(c) it would be impossible for the Company to function properly
if it allowed members of staff to be represented 'by a Trade
Union;
(d) traditionally there are two divisions of labour in the Sugar
Industry, management and its extensions called staff, and, the
rank and file worker, and it was accepted and provided by the
agreement that staff should not be represented by the Unions.10
What the Board had to consider was whether the Company was justified
in its refusal to recognise the Association. In doing that, the Board had
to consider the implications of Sec. 23 of the Constitution of Jamaica which
provides as follows:
Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the
enjoyment of his freedom of peaceful assembly and association,
that is to say, his right peacefully to assemble freely and
associate with other persons and in particular to /orm or belong
to trade unions or other associations for the protection of his
interest."
On behalf of the Association, it was argued that the refusal by the
employer to recognise a particular Trade Union is tantamount to denying
the employee the right of free association and to elong to a trade union
of his choice. At common law the answer is that freedom does not carry
such right and the Board opined that Sec. 23 of the Constitution does not
affect the right of the employer to refuse to recognise and to bargain with
a particular union. On the issue as to whether the employees are en-
titled to unionise, the Board answered in the affirmative, but added a
proviso that those "members of staff who come within the terms manager-
ial, administrative, supervisory and confidential, are all management and
should not be unionised."' 2 In coming to this conclusion, the Board was
particularly impressed by the fact that - 13
It has 'long 'been recognised that the owner of a business, an
employer, must have persons to assist him in the management
of his business. 14 If it were otherwise he couldn't do what was
necessary for its management. It is agreed that the persons who
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assist in the management, are not unionisable. It is recognised
that in an organisation of any complexity there must be certain
employees who are in the organisation to represent the interests
of the employer.
However, the Board was cautious. It warned that it is difficult some-
times to draw a line between those who assist in management and those
who do not.15 The Board further expressed the view that the right of the
worker to join a trade union must be borne in mind in deciding whether
a particular employee was part of management since if it is so decided
he is not unionisable, and that this measure has been introduced as a
practical necessity to have certain employees assist management. In this
sense, therefore, the Board rejected the view that the concept of freedom
of association conferred absolute right on every employee to unionise.
Similar issues were fought in Banton v Alcoa Minerals,16 where the
Jamaica Court of Appeal had to decide whether in the circumstances of
the case, the plaintiffs had been hindered in the enjoyment of their
freedom of association. This question arose as a result of the contention
of the plaintiffs to be effect that: (i) their right of freedom of association
entails representation by a trade union of their choice; (ii) the content of
that freedom must be determined not only by reference to the essential
value of the right, but also by reference to the way in which its effective
exercise contributes to its value; (iii) consequently, the employer is under
a duty to recognise and, for the purposes of collective bargaining, to
treat with the trade union of the employee's choice. 17
The background to those arguments was based on some complicated
facts which, in turn, arose out of a jurisdictional dispute between the two
dominant trade unions in Jamaica, the National Workers' Union18 and the
Bustamante Industrial Trade Union19 with regards to the representation
of workers of the Alcoa Mineral Inc. Without going into the rather pro-
tracted events which took place in the dispute, the relevant aspects of the
case could be put thus: the Company, after a poll conducted by the
Ministry of Labour, 20 recognised the BITU as the sole bargaining agent
of the workers. Certain workers in the bargaining unit who 'belonged to
the N.W.U. argued that by so doing the Company created a situation in
which they were hindered in the enjoyment of their freedom of association
in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of Jamaica. 21
Unfortunately, none of these arguments impressed the three judges of
the Jamaica Court of Appeal. 22 They held that the freedom of association
guaranteed under the Constitution of Jamaica insofar as trade unions are
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concerned involves no more than the right to join or to belong to a union
of the worker's choice.2 3 By so holding, the Court agreed with the judg-
ment of Wooding, C. J. which was accepted by the Privy Council in
Collymore v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago24 to the effect that:
. . . freedom of association means no more than freedom to
enter consensual arrangements to promote the common interest
of the association group. The object may be any of many. They
may be religious or social, political or philosophical, economic
or professional, educational or cultural, sporting or charitable.25
After rephrasing the sequence of the argument put forward by the
plaintiffs, Graham-Perkins, J.A. expressed his astonishment in these words:
There are, of course, other equally far reaching implications but
I do not pursue them. I am content to say . . . that there is
little that would have been more surprising to the architects of
our Constitution than to have been told that they were entrench-
ing a right that would give rise to such dramatic consequences.2 6
He therefore concluded:
. . . there is not a scintilla of evidence in this case that the
plaintiffs, or any of them, have been hindered in the enjoyment
of their freedom of association. There is not the vaguest sugges-
tion that they, or any of them, were in any way hindered in
the exercise of their right to join or to belong to the union of
their choice. No one sought to deny them, or any of them, that
right, nor indeed, to interfere with its exercises. They were at all
material times, free to join any union they chose to join.27
Having so held, it is, therefore, not surprising that the Court found
the other argument untenable, holding that the right of a worker to join
or belong to a trade union of his choice does not include a right as against
the employer to be represented by that union in negotiations with him.
2. Duty of the Employer to Recognise the Union
Having decided that the constitutional provision does not entitle
a worker to be represented by a union of his choice, it is now left to
discover the Court's reaction to the contention that as a result of the
constitutional guarantee there was a duty on the employer to recognize
the union.28 The argument is: the freedom of the worker to join a trade
union of his choice entails that the worker is entitled to be represented
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by that union but no other. If so, there is a corresponding obligation on
the part of the employer to recognise the union of the employee's choice
for the purposes of collective bargaining.
The neutrality of the common law in this area of labour relations
is particularly conspicuous for it neither encourages nor discourages
recognition. It imposes no duty on the employer to recognise a trade
union nor does it confer on the union a right to be recognised by the
employer, far less an obligation on the parties to treat and enter into
collective bargaining with each other.29 So, in the Commonwealth
Caribbean as well as in the United Kingdom, recognition matters were
often settled either by voluntary agreement between the parties or by
resort to economic pressure by way of industrial action.
With this background, it was then left to the Court of Appeal of
Jamaica to decide whether the constitutional guarantee has now supplied
the omission of the common law. The Court held that no such duty
was imposed by the relevant section of the Constitution. On his part,
Graham Perkins, J. declared:
. .. in the absence of any enactment imposing on employer
a clear duty to recognize and negotiate with the trade union
of their employees' choice, the recognition by any employer
of any particular trade union must ultimately depend on social
and economic sanction. 30
When this case was decided in Jamaica, the "clear duty to recognise
and negotiate" had already been imposed by express enactment in Trinidad
and Tobago,31 Dominica 32 and the Bahamas." Now, the Jamaicans have
proposed to introduce the compulsory recognition system into their labour
relations.34 Under the new Jamaica Labour Relations and Industrial
Disputes Act, 1974,35 the Minister may, at the request of the employer
or a trade union claiming bargaining rights in relation to the workers
or a category of workers in the employer's undertaking, conduct a secret
ballot with a view to finding out whether the majority of the workers
who were eligible to vote 36 indicated their wish to be represented by a
particular trade union. The exercise of this power arises in any case of
doubt or dispute:
(a) As to whether the workers, or a particular category of the
workers, in the employment of an employer wish any, and
if so which, trade union to have bargaining rights in re-
lation to them; or
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(b) as to which of two or more trade unions claiming bargain.
ing rights in relation to such workers or category of
workers should be recognised as having such bargaining
rights. 37
Having thus ascertained, the Minister must accordingly inform the em-
ployer and every trade union concerned in the ballot about the result. 3 8
Then the duty is imposed on the employer to:
Recognise that trade union as having bargaining rights in
relation to the workers who were eligible to vote and in relation
to any bargaining unit in which they may, for the time being,
be included, and shall inform the Minister and the trade union
in writing of such recognition.3 9
In a circumstance where two or more unions are claiming bargaining
rights and after a ballot has been taken and none of the unions emerged
as being favoured by a majority of the workers but where the ballot
shows that two or three of those unions obtained not less than thirty
percent of the number of the workers eligible to vote, joint bargaining
rights may come into vogue if at least two of the unions concerned re-
quest the Minister in writing that they wish so to be treated. So, the
Minister informs the employer that the unions wish to be recognised as
having joint bargaining rights.40 In this case too, the employer must
recognise the unions as such.41
3. Free Collective Bargaining and Right to Strike
In order to convince the Court of Appeal of Jamaica that the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of association goes beyond merely joining
or belonging to a trade union, the plaintiffs in Banton had undoubtedly
a formidable battle against the Privy Council decision to the contrary
in Collymore.42 In that case, the appellants asked the Courts in Trinidad
and Tobago and the Privy Council to declare ultra vires the Industrial
Stabilisation Act, 1965,43 on the ground that certain of its provisions
infringed and abridged"4 and abrogated 45 the right of free collective
bargaining46 and the right to strike which are common law47 rights,
additionally guaranteed to trade unions by the Constitution of the People
of Trinidad and Tobago, 48 and ILO Conventions 8749 and 9850 of which
Trinidad and Tobago is a signatory. 51
The Industrial Stabilisation Act was the regime of law which com-
pletely transformed the corpus of labour relations in Trinidad and Tobago
by introducing the compulsory system of arbitration through the establish-
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ment of an Industrial Court and especially by prohibiting strike actions
in connection with trade disputes unless the Minister of Labour failed to
refer the matter to the Industrial Court. The Court of Appeal of Trinidad
and Tobago held, inter alia, that the right of free collective bargaining
and the right to strike are not included in the fundamental freedom of
association recognised and declared by the Constitution and are therefore
not protected under the Constitution.5
2
Although the Privy Council accepted that the Industrial Stabilisation
Act abridged the freedom to bargain collectively and the freedom to
strike, they also denied that either of these freedoms could be equated
with the freedom of association and assembly which does not go as far
as sanctioning all purposes for which they associate or all objects which
they pursue in Association.S3
An Indian judge, on the other hand, has come to a contrary con-
clusion in Utar Pradeshiya Shramik Maka Singh v State of Uttar
Pradesh.S4 The judge was called upon to consider a statute of the State
of Uttar Pradesh which tended to restrict the formation of trade unions
and generally to restrict the association clause of the Constitution of
India. Dhavan, J. found that the purpose of association is an integral
part of the right and if the purpose is restricted, the right is then also
restricted. Accordingly, if the state sought to restrict the purposes or
objects or the normal functioning of an association, this would necessarily
involve a restriction on the freedom of association. In addition, he found
that the primary purpose of forming a trade union is to take collective
action to safeguard the interest of the persons forming the association.
What seems to have influenced him in coming to that conclusion is
that "in the peculiar conditions in India, collective bargaining on be.
half of workmen is almost the only function of the overwhelming majority
of the trade unions, the subsidiary purpose of functions as friendly societies
conferring material benefits on the members being almost unknown." On
the basis of this statement therefore, the Jamaican Court of Appeal found
the instrument to distinguish the circumstances of trade unionism in
India from the Jamaican situation. Hence, the argument which the
appellants in Banton's case frame around the Indian case was rejected.
There is no doubt that had it been cited to the Courts in Collymore they
would have rejected it also.
4. Right to Join a Trade Union
The courts in both Collymore and Banton were explicit in stating
that the expression "freedom of association" in the Constitution extends
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no more than that a worker is entitled to join a trade union of his
choice. However, the pronouncements in those cases have left open the
question whether the constitutional guarantee will aid a worker who
applies for, but is refused admission in a trade union of his choice.
Could such applicant invoke the constitutional provision in order to
secure membership in the union? 55
There is no doubt that if the applicant does not satisfy the admission
requirements in accordance with the union rules, the courts will not
force them to admit him, since he may not have a cause of action at
common law. 56 But can the courts act otherwise if the reason for refusal
is based on some discriminatory ground? Is the common law, and now,
the Constitution, of any assistance?
The traditional common law position on this matter could be de-
scribed as one of hopelessness for the situation is simply this:
The body has a clear right to prescribe qualifications for mem-
bership. It may make it exclusive as it sees fit. It may make
restriction on the line of citizenship, nationality, age, creed or
profession as well as numbers. This power is incident to its
character as a voluntary association.5 7
It has been submitted that the absence of a contractual relationship be-
tween the applicant and the Union is the reason why the common law
courts found themselves unable to intervene.58 This brought about some
artificial contractual implication by the courts in order to extend their
review powers to these bodies.5 9 But the current thought is that no such
contractual nexus is necessary; an interference with the right to work
is sufficient to bring about judicial intervention.60
The English case of Nagle v Fielden6' is now cited as having
substantially offset the previous common law stand on this matter.62
A woman trainer of many years standing was refused a license by a
Jockey Club on the ground of her sex. The refusal to issue her a license
was described as arbitrary by the Court of Appeal since it affected the
pursuit of her profession. All the three judges63 of the Court were of the
opinion that the Jockey Club's action was contrary to the prevailing public
policy of the English people.
In the case of a West Indian trade union refusing a person's applica-
tion for membership on the ground of sex or race, will the rule in
Nagle's case likely be applicable? It will probably apply if the refusal is
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tantamount to a denial of the person's right to work. But one thing is
clear; that is, Nagle's case concerns refusal to issue a license to practice
a particular occupation. But a refusal to admit a person in a trade union
may not necessarily deprive the applicant of a right to work. Trade Unions
in the Caribbean are mostly general unions,6 and even in those cases
where there are industrial unions,65 union membership is not often made
a condition precedent to obtaining employment nor is there a requirement
that shortly after taking up employment the worker shall join the union at
the work place. The closed shop system and the union shop practices6 are
practically non-existent here. The basic difference between the English
experience and our circumstances in the Caribbean is that whilst in closed
shop undertakings as they used to exist in the U.K. (and as may be au-
thorised under the Industrial Relations Act), a man cannot practice his
profession if he does not belong to the union representing the employees
in the place of work, in the Caribbean no such plight of workers exist.
67
It may be argued in general that an employee may not get adequate
representation in the undertaking unless he is a member of a union. In
Trinidad and Tobago this will pose little or no problem in a sense, for a
worker need not be a member of a union in order to benefit from the
terms of collective agreements struck by the union at the bargaining unit
68
or for the purposes of representation in the event of individual employ-
ment grievance,69 although he may now be obliged to contribute towards
the administration of that union irrespective of whether he is a member
or not.
7 0
Whether the constitutional provisions will aid the applicant's case
is also doubtful. A typical West Indian constitutional provision reads:
71
It is hereby recognised and declared that in Trinidad and
Tobago there have existed and shall continue to exist without
discrimination by reason of race, origin, colour, religion or sex,
[political opinion] 72 the following human rights and fundamental
freedoms namely, (j) freedom of association.
The only circumstance in which the meaning of this clause has been
considered in the Caribbean in connection with admission was the issue
which arose in Trinidad in 1969 when a black American couple who was
visiting the island alleged that the Trinidad Country Club -a social
club - -had refused to admit them to the Club because they were black.
The sole commissioner, appointed by the Governor-General to investigate
the issue, had to consider the implications of that clause to the question
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of freedom of association. 73 Phillips, C.J. (Ag.) not only found that there
was no racial discrimination involved in the matter, but he also emphasized
that:
* . . in relation to the exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of association ... there is no implied obligation imposed
on any individual citizen desiring to associate with others to see
to it that any association which he organises or of which he is a
member should contain members of different 'race, origin, colour,
religion, or sex'. The reality of the matter is that any such impli-
cation, if it existed, would be inconsistent with and in fact be
the very negation of the freedom of association recognised and
protected by the Constitution. 74
The learned Commissioner found as an analogy to this matter the right
of an individual to choose his own friends, "a choice which is usually
dictated by the accidental circumstances of one's birth, education etc."'75
He did not consider it worthwhile that legislation was necessary to regulate
admission matters in voluntary associations and social clubs since "any
attempt, by means of legislation or otherwise, to compel him to associate
with particular persons or groups of persons would be running counter
to a principle which is basic to democratic institutions as we know them. 76
Whether or not the constitutional protections will extend to cover
discriminatory acts of trade unions is still a question the answer to which
is lost in the jungle of undecided issues. The constitutional protections
also talk about any law abridging the rights. Perhaps the only indication,
and one rather unclear, is the case of Tierney v Amalgamated Society of
Wood Workers7 7 where an Irish Judge expressed the view that the union's
action in the circumstances "can only be regarded as interfering with the
plaintiffs right to work in a particular way as a member of a particular
body, that is, as a carpenter who is a member of this union". 78 Again, this
statement is unhelpful bearing in mind the circumstances of the case, i.e.
membership in a craft union as opposed to membership in a general union,
which is the common feature of most Caribbean trade unions. 79 Finally,
the right to work is not expressly protected in any of the Commonwealth
Caribbean Constitutions.o
Neither the Bahamas s nor the Trinidad and Tobago Industrial Re-
lations Act 82 nor indeed the new Jamaica Labour Relations and Industrial
Disputes Act 3 provides for the situations under discussion. The United
Kingdom Industrial Relations Act,84 on the other hand, stipulates what it
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terms "guiding principles" for organisations of workers. In relation to
membership in industrial organisations the Act states:
Any person who applies for membership of the organisation,
or of a branch or section of the organisation, and who-
(a) is a worker of the description, or (as the case may be) of
one of the descriptions, of which, in accordance with the
rules of the organisation, the organisation or that branch or
section, as the case may be, is intended wholly or mainly
to consist, or of which it wholly or mainly consists, and
(b) is appropriately qualified for employment as a worker
of that description, shall not, by way of any arbitrary or
unreasonable discrimination, be excluded from membership
of the organisation or of that branch or section of it.15
PROTECTION AGAINST VICTIMIZATION
In order to give meaning to the expression "freedom of association,"
a new trend has developed in recent labour legislation purporting to secure
the enjoyment of this right to workers. s 6 In the Caribbean, the first statute
of this kind was the now repealed Industrial Stabilisation Act, 1965, of
Trinidad and Tobago.8 7 Among a number of innovations introduced into
the labour relations law of that country by the Act, were provisions de-
signed to prohibit the dismissal or the taking of any other kind of action
which may have adverse effect on the employee in relation to his employ-
ment for reasons of his union membership, activities or position held in
such organisation.88 Mere threat in that direction was also forbidden by
the Act. Since then, similar protections are given to workers in Dominica 9
and the Bahamas.90 In Trinidad and Tobago, the present law is embodied
in the Industrial Relations Act, 1972.91 These statutory protections not-
withstanding, there are still instances of employers victimizing employees
for trade union membership.92 More importantly, the 1965-67 law ap-
peared hopeless as the victims obtained no remedy under the justice ad-
ministered through the Industrial Court because of the clumsy definition
of the term "worker" under that Act.9 3
Granted that these new regimes of labour relations law now purport
to protect the worker's freedom of association by prohibiting discrimina-
tory treatment by the employer because of the worker's interest, member-
ship or activities in a trade union. But, exactly what does this protection
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cover? Here recent English decisions are illustrative.94 In Central Elec-
tricity Generating Board v Coleman & Others,95 the question was whether
the employer had discriminated against certain employees in contravention
of Sec. 5(2) (b) & (4) of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, by publishing
a notice inviting nominations only from members of any of the recognised
unions to fill the vacancy in the works committee established in the
bargaining unit. This committee was made up of representatives of man-
agement and workers drawn from the four recognised unions in the
bargaining unit. The complainants were members of a non-recognised
union. Their nomination papers were rejected by the employer. On com-
plaining to the Industrial Tribunal, it was held that the employer had
discriminated against the complainants. They had a right to be eligible
for election to the committee, hence the employer had no right to refuse
to accept their nomination papers on the ground that they were not
members of one of the recognised unions.
On appeal to the National Industrial Relations Court, it was held
that the employer had not "discriminated against" the complainants
within the meaning of Sec. 5(2) (b) & (4) of the Act. The Court's reason-
ing was based on the construction of the subsections as contemplating a
detriment suffered or benefit enjoyed by a worker as an individual in the
context of his contract of employment and were not aimed at discrimina-
tion in the sense of differentiation between certain groups of workers. The
Court took into account the fact that the Act had made provisions for
recognition of trade unions for the purposes of collective bargaining. Hence
Sir John Donaldson, P. expressed the view that "it is inherent in such
recognition that for some purposes an employer will be obliged to dis-
criminate between those of his employees who are members of the unions
concerned and those who are not."'96
In Post Office v Ravyts, 97 the N.I.R.C. had reversed the decision of
the Industrial Tribunal by holding that although Sec. 5(2) of the IRA
(U.K.) forbade discrimination by an employer against an employee for
the employee's membership or activities in a registered trade union, it did
not proscribe the employers from discriminating against the registered
trade union itself. Further, that the right embodied in Sec. 5(1)(c) did
not confer any right on members of a trade union as against the will of
their employers to take part in trade union activities on the premises of
the employer.
The Court of Appeal reversed this decision and restored the tribunal's
judgment in Crouch v The Post Office.98 In Post Office v Union of Post
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Office Workers,99 the House of Lords affirming the Court of Appeal,
unanimously dismissed the appeal by the Post Office. Their Lordships
held that the right granted under the relevant sub-section was one which
entitled the employee to conduct union activities on the employers' prem-
ises, but only outside the working hours. Since Sec. 5 (1) (c) gave mem-
bers of trade unions the right to take part in the activities of the union,
they had the right to conduct on their employers' premises all such activities
which could be carried on without assistance from the employer, since the
act does not oblige an employer to provide such assistance. The activities
contemplated by Sec. 5(1) (c) in respect of a trade union official would
include visits to those premises where the members work, provided, how-
ever, that "real inconvenience" is not caused to the employer.
On the question of the discriminatory practices of the Post Office in
not allowing unrecognised associations "the various privileges designed
to assist the recognised associations in the management of union affairs,"
their Lordships held that insofar as the Post Office had granted facilities
to members of the U.P.W. they went beyond anything they were required
to do by Sec. 5(1) (c). But they were bound by Sec. 5(2) (b), after
making allowances for the respective sizes of the two unions, to provide
comparable facilities to members of the T.S.A., other than facilities that
were required by the U.P.W. by virtue of their status as sole bargaining
agents. If the Post Office failed to provide comparable facilities to the
T.S.A. within Sec. 5(2) by reason of their exercising rights conferred
on them by Sec. 5(1) to join one union rather than another, to the extent
that members of T.S.A. would as a result, be in a substantially worse
position than members of the U.P.W., it was discriminatory against the
T.S.A. in breach of Sec. 5(2) ('b).
In Howle v. G.E.C. Power Engineering,100 the N.I.R.C. held that an
unrecognised union is not entitled to the facilities for exercising negotiat-
ing rights, since the Act authorises an employer to recognise a union or
unions to the exclusion of others. In such a case, a member of the un-
recognised union cannot complain of -breach of Sec. 5(2) (b) as against
him. But if an employee is deprived of a union representative's negotia-
tion facility, then that clearly is a breach of the subsection.
RIGHT TO DISSOCIATE
Although there is no West Indian case in point, it is more than prob-
able that the courts here will be prepared to hold, if and when the oppor-
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tunity presents itself, that freedom of association of essence encompasses
not only the right of the individual worker to associate, but also a negative
implication that the worker is free not to associate or to terminate the
association at any stage.
The Irish case of Meskell v C.I.E."" concerned the argument by an
employee who had been dismissed and offered a new contract which con-
tained a condition binding him at all times to be a member of a repre-
sentative union. The employee contended, inter alia, that the condition in
the proffered contract restricted his liberty by attempting to confine his
choice to the said representative union thus infringing his constitutional
right embodied in Art. 9 of the Irish Republican Constitution and that
it also deprived him of his right to remain out of any union.
These arguments were rejected by the trial judge, Teevan, J. who
held that the plaintiff was not in any way restricted in his choice of a
union. Although the plaintiff had to belong to a representative union,
this did not stop him and others forming one of their own. Teevan, J. held
further, that the purpose of the arrangement between the employer and the
unions was not intended to injure the plaintiff but to advance the legitimate
interests of the unions and the defendants. The plaintiff's action was
therefore struck out.
Mr. J. P. Casey has since criticised this judgment.10 2 He points out
that the reasoning which suggests that the plaintiff and others were not
restricted in case they wished to form a union of their own was "very
questionable,""' 3 because even if the plaintiff and others were successful
in forming a union it would not necessarily have been "representative"
within the contemplation of the contract. Another reason cited by the
author was that the difficulties of forming a union in Ireland could
hardly be underestimated in view of the fact that before a union could
negotiate terms and conditions of employment on behalf of its members
it had to deposit a sum of £1,000 in the High Court in accordance with
the Trade Union Act, 1941. Mr. Casey further challenged the correctness
of this decision on the ground that the effect of the revised terms of the
contract between the employer and the union was certainly "to take away
the plaintiff's right of free dissociation." Strongly in favour of Mr. Casey's
argument is the judgment of Budd, J. and the Supreme Court of Ireland
in Educational Co. v. Fitzpatrick.104
Teevan, J.'s judgment has now been reversed by the Irish Supreme
Court 05 and Mr. Casey has been proven right in his criticisms of that
judgment. The Supreme Court has held that the dismissal of the appellant
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because of his refusal to accept the conditions imposed by the terms of the
new contract was an infringement of his personal liberty guaranteed by
Art. 9 of the Constitution in that the freedom of association entails the
right to join a trade union or to form associations or unions and, accord-
ing to Walsh, J. carries with it "the implicit guarantee of the right of
dissociation." 106
There is no doubt that the principle established in Meskel2s case107
will have considerable policy implications for West Indian labour law
especially in those countries where, although there is a constitutional
guarantee of freedom of association, there is no provision either in the
Constitution or in a statute purporting to specify that no employer shall
dismiss an employee on grounds of the employee's union activities. If this
interpretation is adopted in those countries, it will mean that the con-
stitutional guarantee will override the common law right to dismiss an
employee for any reason whatsoever as long as he gives the employee
adequate or reasonable notice of termination or adequate compensation
in lieu of notice.10 8
Assuming that it is now established that there is a right to dissociate,
can this right be subject to notice of the intention to dissociate on the part
of the member wishing to do so? Suppose a trade union's constitution pro-
vides that a member who wishes to withdraw from the union should give
notice of the intention to do so to the executive council of the union. 10 9
Suppose also that the rule provides further that the member's notice will
be subject to approval by the said committee or any organ of the union,
as the case may be. Here, again, we do not appear to have a West Indian
case in point. But it is fairly clear that the constitutional guarantee would
not necessarily 'be infringed just because the union rules stipulate that
notice of intention to withdraw be given to a certain union organ. It will,
however, be otherwise if the rule stipulates an unreasonable length of
notice. One may base this assertion on two grounds.
Firstly, since the union rule is the contractual document upon which
the relationship of the parties is based and can be enforced in case of
breach, the parties in accordance with the general tenor of the law of
contract recognise, subject to certain exceptions, 110 the right of the other
party to reasonable notice of termination, such requirement in this respect
may not necessarily infringe the right of the individual member to dissoci-
ate. If, on the other hand, this right is regarded as an absolute one, then the
above argument becomes purely academic, since a union rule cannot
stipulate a condition which is contrary to law, written or unwritten.11
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It is submitted, however, that on a balance of probabilities, the former
argument appears more convincing. For instance, the member wishing to
withdraw may be an officer holding a strategic or key position in the
union whose abrupt withdrawal may occasion chaos and confusion. In such
a circumstance the union ought to be given reasonable notice of with-
drawal 12 so as to enable it to find an alternative person to hold together
the reins of the union in the interim.
Secondly, there is nothing like automatic expulsion from a trade
union.113 Expulsion of a member must follow rigidly the relevant procedure
laid down in the union rules and in the absence of stipulation to the
contrary, an expulsion could only lawfully be done after due observance
of the common law requirements of minimum procedural decencies. 114 It
may be argued by way of analogy that the requirement of notice of in-
tention to withdraw, especially where the 'length of notice is not un-
reasonable, may well be within the constitutional protection and not in
contravention of it.
The above argument finds support in the recent English case of
Ashford v ASTHS, 115 where the principles enunciated could be sum-
marised thus: while the court will be prepared to uphold the requirement
of reasonable notice of resignation from a trade union, it is abundantly
clear that it will not uphold any condition as null and void. So, too, the
court will be prepared to accept that it is reasonable to invite a member
to state reasons why he wishes to resign from the union, but that such
could not be made a condition precedent to resignation nor could the
court countenance any union rule requiring a member to apply to any
union organ for permission to resign from the union. Sir John Donandson
espoused the NIRC's decision in the following language:
However beningly this discretionary power may in fact be exer-
cised by the union, it is inherently unreasonable that a member's
right to resign should be fettered in this way, since there can
be no certainty that a differently constituted council would act
reasonably. 116
It must be pointed out that reliance on the United Kingdom experi-
ence on this matter must be read subject to two considerations. Firstly, the
case in point was not decided on the basis of a constitutional guarantee
since the British have no written Constitution. Secondly, the case was
decided on the construction of Sec. 65(3) of the Industrial Relations
Act which states:
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Every member of the organisation shall have the right, on giving
reasonable notice and complying with any reasonable conditions,
to terminate his membership in the organisation at any time.11 7
CONCLUSION
We have seen that the newly written West Indian Constitutions have
all embodied in barest terms the individual freedom of association and
that individual workers have fought battles with a view to reading as a
necessary implication of that provision what they regarded as the raison
d'tre of trade unionism, that is to say, the right to strike and free
collective bargaining but that they have failed to convince the courts that
there was justification for so construing. Again, a similar attempt was
made to extend the ambit of the phrase to create certain legal rights and
obligations, not only that the worker is free to join a union of his choice
but that he has of essence to be at liberty to be represented by a union
of his choice, irrespective of what labour relations practices are. Further,
that the worker having chosen the union to represent him, the employer
is obligated to recognise and enter into negotiations with that union on
the worker's behalf. All of these have now been rejected as not being
within the constitutional framework.
The next thing to consider is the possibility of amending legislation.
Since the above decisions, the only area that has commended itself to the
law-makers is the question of compelling the employer to legally deal with
a union with a view to entering into collective bargaining. It does not seem
that there is the faintest hope that legislation will be passed in contem-
porary Caribbean or in the nearest future to guarantee a worker his right
to strike. On the contrary, the tendency has been to keep a grip on those
who organise strikes - indeed the regulation of strikes by law has been
given a whole-hearted reception by the various Caribbean Governments.118
Recent developments have shown that the right to strike is not likely to
be included in the Constitutions as a fundamental right' 9 nor incorporated
in contemporary labour relations legislation.120 The position, however, is
regrettable, as the meaning of freedom of association needs to be clarified
by legislation. It has been observed that the only effort to concretize the
freedom of association is to prevent victimization for trade union member-
ship and activities as against the employer, but that there is no statutory
protection against the activities of the unions themselves which might tend
to inhibit the individual in the enjoyment of his freedom of association.
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NOTES
lOkpaluba, Chuks, Statutory Regulation of Collective Bargaining in the Carib-
bean, Chapter I.
2
e.g., restraint of trade and criminal conspiracy.
3There is one recent instance of a refusal to register a trade union at the
intervention of the Government alleging that there were too many trade unions
in St. Lucia and subsequently amending substantially the Trade Union Ordinance
of that island in order to impose stiff requirements for registration of trade unions.
4 For an analysis of the various freedoms entrenched in the Caribbean Con-
stitutions see "Fundamental Human Rights, the Courts and the West Indian
Constitutions" by Chuks Okpaluba, in Proceedings of the Conference on the
Implications of Independence for Grenada, Institute of International Relations,
U.W.I., St. Augustine.
SThe Independence Constitutions include those of Jamaica (1962); Trinidad
and Tobago (1962); Barbados (1966); Guyana (1966-70); Bahamas (1973) and
Grenada (1974).
6Here reference is made to the Constitutions of the Associated States of
Antigua; Dominica; St. Lucia; St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla; and St. Vincent, all of
which were written in 1967.
7There are at least three other instances in which the interference with the
freedom of association might be or has been in question. It must be noted that
these instances have not been presented in the Courts. Two of these illustrations
come from the Bahamas and are contained in the Industrial Relations Act, 1970.
First, that Act contains provisions to the effect that the Registrar of Trade Unions
shall not register as a trade union any body, association, federation or congress
which under its constitution offers membership to any other trade union, body
or association (Schedule I, Part I, Clause 4). On the other hand, it is unlawful
under the Act for a union to function without being registered (Sec. 6). Secondly,
Sec. 38(1) declares it unlawful for a trade union to federate, associate, or align
itself with any international organisation of trade unions without a licence
obtained from the Minister of Labour for that purpose. The grant of such licence
is at the absolute discretion of the Minister who may, in exercising the said
discretion, grant the licence conditionally or without conditions, or may refuse
to grant it (Sec. 38 (2)). The question which one may ask is whether the con,
stitutionally guaranteed individual freedom of association may cover the freedom
of the unions themselves to associate with each other or to associate with unions
outside of the Bahama Islands.
Our third illustration assumes an entirely different complexion. In 1965, an
Act entitled The Canefarmers and Cess Act was passed in Trinidad and Tobago
which incorporated the Trinidad Islandwide Cane Farmers Association and bestowed
on its management committee the sole representational right over all matters con-
cerning the business of canefarming and the welfare of canefarmers in the country.
The issue which has come to the fore for the first time is that a trade union -
the Islandwide Cane Farmers Trade Union - which was formed and registered
sometime early 1973 has found that under the present statutory arrangements it
cannot represent its members in any issues concerning them in the sugar belt.
Although the Union has hitherto filed no suit purporting to challenge the vires
of the 1965 Act, the gravamen of its argument, which it has sought to back up
with protest marches, demonstrations, sit-ins and other forms of political agitation,
is that the Act is unconstitutional, since it purports to deny a cane farmer his
freedom to join and to be represented by a trade union of his choice but compels
him to belong to the Trinidad Islandwide Cane Farmers Association against his
will.
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SSee the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the dispute between the
Jamaica Sugar Estates and certain of its employees, dated October 12, 1965,
hereinafter, McGregor Report.
91bid, at p. 3
lOlbid, at p. 30.
1t1talics supplied.
12McGregor Report, p. 3X.
131bid, at p. 37.
14This practice was given legal validity in Trinidad and Tobago in 1965 under
the definition section of the Industrial Stabilisation Act which excluded from the
definition of a "worker" any person comprised in or responsible for the manage-
ment of any undertaking. In 1967, that provision was clarified to mean any person
responsible for policy-making in or the effective control or discretion of any under-
taking. This aspect of the definition of worker has been retained in the Industrial
Relations Act, 1972 (which repealed the 1965 Act and its amendments) with
further modification to the effect that a person is not a worker if he is responsible
for, or has an effective voice in, the formulation of policy in any undertaking or
business, or the effective control of the whole or any department of any under-
taking or business. Sometimes too, collective agreements signed in other countries
by trade unions and employers recognise this practice. For example, the preamble
to the Agreement between Dominica Construction Ltd. and the Dominica Waterfront
and Allied Workers' Union states that Supervisory and Confidential staff are
excluded from the agreement, and by Supervisory and Confidential staff the parties
meant: Managers, Accounting Officers, Clerks having access to confidential material
and Accounts, Foremen and any other who by mutual consent may reasonably be
regarded as participating in management or who may be charged with duties
involving the supervision of others.
15 In Electric Ice Co. v Federated Workers' Trade Union (1967) 12 WIR 362,
the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago was called upon to adjudicate a
dispute between the union and the employer which involved union representation
of an employee designated "Branch Manager." The employer's argument was that
no dispute existed between the Company and the union within that definition
of the ISA because it concerned a person who was part of management. Affirming
the judgment of the Industrial Court, Wooding C.J. (Phillips and Fraser, JJ.A
concurring) laid down the principle that what is important is the function per-
formed by the person and not by what title he is designated. In deciding whether
the "Branch Manager" performed managerial functions or not, the Chief Justice
accepted the learned opinion of the President of the Industrial Court that the
employee in question was "no more than a conduit pipe, performing duties of a
rountine or clerical nature which did not require the use of independent judg-
ment ... and that he was responsible to but no responsible for management." The
power to control and direct is, therefore, the controlling test. See also in Re
Crown Employees (General) Conciliation Committee (1934) A.R. 125 (New South
Wales) based on Sec. 5 of the New South Wales Industrial Arbitration Act, 1940
(as amended); and Canadian cases based on the Ontario Labour Relations Act,
1950, Sec. 1(3)(b) (see now RSO, 1970), Re Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd.
and Ontario Labour Relations Board (1956), 4 D.L.R. (2d.) 243 (Ontario High
Court) reversed on other grounds [19571 OR 316 (Ontario Court of Appeal);
Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. Case, O.L.R.B. Monthly Report, September 1966,
p. 379 where the Board stated -
If the majority of a person's time is occupied by work similar to that
performed by employees within the bargaining unit and such person
has no effective control or authority over the employees in the bargaining
unit but is merely a conduit carrying orders or instructions from manage-
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ment to the employees, the person cannot be said to exercise managerial
functions within the meaning of Sec. 1(3)(b) of the Act.
See also Barbara Jarvis and Associated Medical Services Inc. (1961) reproduced
in Labour Relations Law: Cases, Materials & Commentary, compiled by the Labour
Relations Law Casebook Group, at p. 98; the Canadian Union of Public Employees
-CLC, Ont. Hydro Employees Union, Local 1000 and the Hydro-Electric Power
Commission of Ontario [19691 OLRB Monthly Report, August 669.
16(1971) 17 WIR 275.
t7 As summarised by Graham-Perkins and Parnell, JJ.A. pp. 283 and 290,
respectively.
1t Hereinafter N.W.U.
t 9 Hereinafter B.I.T.U.
20 1n accordance with the practice established in Jamaica and agreed to by
the unions and the employers during the early fifties as a result of the emergence
of the N.W.U. in the Jamaican labour scene. See Guide to Industrial Relations
in Jamaica, Ministry of Labour, 1966.
21Quaere whether the fundamental guarantee could be contravened as against
an individual by a non-governmental agency or public authority and if so whether
the individual has a cause of action against such person under the Constitution.
This problem was carefully sidestepped by the Court of Appeal of Jamaica in
Banton's case.
22 Graham-Perkins, Parnell and Robotham, JJ.A.
2 3Citing Grunfeld, Modern Trade Union Law, at p. 37.
24[1969] 2 All E.R. 1207; [1970] AC 538; [1970] 2 WLR 233; (1969) 15
WIR 229.
25(1967) 12 WIR 5 at p. 15 (Trinidad and Tobago C.A.).
26(1971) 17 WIR at p. 283.
27Ibid, at p. 289.
28The opinion of the Board of Enquiry on this matter has already been dis-
cussed. A one-man Commissioner of Enquiry into the claim for recognition by
Foremen of Kaiser Engineers is reported as finding that the Company was under
no obligation to recognise the Union as the bargaining agent for the category of
workers in question (quoted in "Unionisaton of Foremen and Supervisors", Jamai-
can Employers' Federation, Members' Guide, July 1972, at p. 2).
29 See Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (1st ed.) at p. 103; Khan-
Freund in Flanders & Clegg, Industrial Relations in Great Britain, p. 55.
301n Banton v. Alcoa Minerals (1971) 17 WIR 275.
3HIndustrial Stabilisation Act, 1965, Sec. 3. For the failure of this pioneering
experiment and its replacement with new provisions see chapter 6 of Statutory
Regulation of Collective Barganing, op. cit.
32Trade Disputes (Arbitration & Enquiry) (Amendment) Act, 1967 as sub-
sequently amended.
3 31ndustrial Relations Act, 1970.
34 The Industrial Disputes Bill, 1970 proposed by the previous Government had
nothing on recognition.
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43This action was based on Art. 2 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago to
the effect that Parliament shall not enact laws that shall abridge, abrogate or
infringe any of the entrenched fundamental freedoms and, on Art. 6 under which
the individual is entitled to challenge such Act of Parliament. But for such plain-
tiff to succeed he must allege and prove that some legal right(s) of his has been
violated in relation to himself. On the whole subject of judicial review of legislation
in the West Indies see A.R. Carnegie, "Judicial Review of legislation in the West
Indian Constitution" (1972) Public Law, p. 276. For the most recent cases on the
matter see Francis v. Chief of Police [1970] 15 WIR 1 (W.I.A.S., C.A.); [1973]
2 WLR 505 (P.C.) where it was held that legislation purporting to curtail the
mode of communication at public meetings was not ultra vires and not in breach
of the individual's freedom of expression; and Antigua Times Ltd. v. Attorney
General of Antigua and Minister of Home Affairs of Antigua (unreported) (1972)
(Louisy, J), Attorney General of Antigua and Minister of Home Affairs of Antigua
v Antigua Times Ltd. (1973) (unreported) (W.I.A.S., C.A.) where certain legisla-
tion were declared ultra vires for being an infringement of the freedom of the
press in that island (Peterkin, J.A. (Ag.) dissenting).
4 4Sec. 34 virtually proscribed strikes and made the taking of such action subject
to ministerial approval and it was a manifest Government policy to cut down or
completely halt strike actions.
4 SSec. 36 prohibited strikes in the essential services, while section 37 set out
categories of employees who under no circumstance could go on strike, e.g. the
Police, Defense Force, Prison Officers and the Public Service.
46Secs. 18-26 dealt with industrial agreenents and stated that they were
subject to the examination of the Minister of Labour whose responsibility it was
to transmit the agreement to the Industrial Court for registration, together with a
notice containing the ground of any objection which he might have against the
agreement.
4 7There are dicta in both the English and the Canadian jurisdictions suggesting
that the enactment of the Trade Union Act was a recognition of the worker's right
to strike. See e.g. per Lord Bramwell in Mogul S.S. v. McGregar, Gow & Co.
[1892] AC 25 at p. 47; Lord Wright in Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co.
Ltd. v. Vietch [1942] 1 All E.R. 142 at pp. 58-159; Newall v Barker & Bruce
(1950) 2 DLR 289 at 299, per Rand, J.; R. v Canadian Ry. Co. 31 DLR (2d)
209 at p. 215, per McRuer, C. J. of the Ontario High Court, affirmed sub. nom.
Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v Zambri 34 DLR (2d) 654.
48Art. 1(j), Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago (1962).
4 9Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention,
1948.
SORight to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949.
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51Apart from the fact that these Conventions, like other Conventions of the
International Organisations are not usually binding on the individual members of
the International Labour Organisation until the members have not only ratified the
Convention but also gone further to incorporate the terms of the Convention
in the country's municipal legislation. The late Director-General of the ILO had
written in his book, International Protection of Free Trade Unions that a refusal
by an employer to bargain with a particular union is not regarded as an infringe-
ment of freedom of association, appropriate for the consideration of the Governing
Body's Committee on freedom of association. Dr. Jenks then referred to cases from
British Guiana (now Guyana) and British Honduras (now Belize) to illustrate his
point (at p. 350).
52The Constitution Commission of Trinidad and Tobago was urged by the
Trinidad and Tobago Labour Congress to include in its recommendations of a new
Constitution for the People of Trinidad and Tobago a right to strike. Even the
Public Service Association whose members are traditionally barred from striking
called on the Commission to give back to public servants the right to strike. Their
General Secretary told the Commission: "we feel that a thing as important as this
(i.e. right to strike), as fundamental as this, ought to find its way into the Constitu-
tion and, therefore, again today we reaffirm the call for this right to become a
fundamental right and find its way in our Constitution." (See Public Service
Review, No. 5, May 15, 1973). On its part, the Commission did not share the views
of the labour movement on this question. It was of opinion that emphasis in the
country should be on the "generation of new wealth and the restructuring of the
society so that the wealth produced will be more equitably distributed than it is at
present. Creating a right to strike would be emphasising the negative." Because a
"strike . . . produced no wealth and, where an essential service is involved, may
expose the community to grave dangers or hold it up to ransom." While the Com-
mission did not think that it was proper to totally disbar a worker from striking, they
saw "no reason to elevate it to the status of a constitutionally enshrined right-on
the same plane as the right to life or to personal liberty." (See Report of the Con-
stitution Commission, January 22, 1974, paragraph 92).
5 3Lord Donovan said ([1969] 2 All E.R. at 1211) that "the question is
whether the abridgment of the rights of free collective bargaining .. . are abridg.
ments of the freedom of association." He then referred to the judgment of the
Courts below and citing per Wooding, C.J. (supra), concluded: "Their Lordships ...
agree with the Courts below in the rejection of the appellant's main argument."
(at p. 1212).
54AIR (1960) All 45.
55For the common law cases on when an applicant for membership becomes a
member of the union, see Rideout, Right to Membership of a Trade Union, Chapter
IV. For the recent case on this point see per Megarry, J. in Woodford v Smith
[1970] 1 All E. R. 1091.
56See e.g. Martin v Western District of Australian Coal & Shale Employee's
Federation, Workers' Industrial Union of Australia (Mining Dept.) (1934) S.R.N.S.W.
539. Contra the Canadian case: Williams & Rees v Local Union No. 1562, United
Mine Workers of America & Young (1918) 41 DLR 709, (affirmed) 14 Alta.
L.R. 251 where the refusal to admit resulted in loss of employment and it was held
that the individuals involved were liable in damages.
S7Per Green, V.C. in Mayer v Journeyman Stonecutters' Association (1890)
(N.J.) 20A 492. For a good account of the practices in American Unions before
the intervention by the legislature see Summers, "The Right to Join a Union"
(1947) 47 Col. L.R. 33. For the Canadian cares on this issue see Graham v Brick-
layers' and Masons' Union (1908) 9 WLR (Court of Appeal of British Columbia);
Guelph v White et. al. (1946) 4 DLR 114 (Supreme Court of British Columbia).
The English cases on this include Faramus v Film Artistes Association [1964] AC
925; Weinberger v Inglis [1919] AC 606.
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5SSee Grodin, Union Govemment and the Law: British and American Ez-
periences, at p. 64.
59 See Davies v Carew-Pole [1956] 1 WLR 833; Bryne v Kinematograph
Renters [1958] 2 All E.R. 579.
60Per Denning, M.R. in Nagle v Fielden [1966] 2 Q.B. 633.
6lSupra.
62Rideout, "Admission to Non-Statutory Association Controlling Employment"
(1967) 30 MLR 389.
6 3Lord Denning, M.R. Salmon and Danckwerts, LJJ.
64For an account of the organisational structure of Caribbean Trade Unions
see Henry, Labour Relations and Industrial Conflict in Commonwealth Caribbean
Countries.
6 5E.g. in Sugar and Oil Industries and the Waterfront.
66On the operation of these practices see McCarthy, The Closed Shop in
Britain. See now the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 (U.K.) on "Approved Closed
Shop Agreements", Sees. 7, 17 and Schedule I. The Federal Industrial Relations
and Disputes Investigation Act legislation permits the inclusion of a closed shop
or union shop clauses in collective agreements in Canada. On the other hand, the
U.S. Labour Relations legislation appears to be against closed shops. See Sec.
8(a)(3) National Labour Relations Act, 1935 as amended by the Labour-Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947 and the Labour Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, 1959. In Trinidad and Tobago an employer cannot make union membership
a condition of employment - Industrial Relations Act, 1972, Sec. 42(2)(a).
671n this sense, the pronouncements in Edwards v SOGAT [1971] Ch. 354 are
not, given our present circumstances, relevant to the Caribbean context.
68Under the Industrial Relations Act, 1972, Sec. 35(a), upon certification as a
recognised majority union in the bargaining unit, the union so certified is bound to
bargain collectively on behalf of the workers in that bargaining unit. It is also
obliged to process all employment grievances within the bargaining unit.
69 One of the effects of the certification system under the Industrial Relations
Act of Trinidad and Tobago is that the certified majority union has "exclusive
authority" to bargain on behalf of the workers in the bargaining unit and to bind
them by a collective agreement (s. 35(a)).
70See Trinidad and Tobago IRA, Secs. 72-76 in connection with agency
shop orders. This aspect of the Act has been dealt with in Chapter 10 of Statutory
Regulation of Collective Bargaining in the Caribbean, I.S.E.R. Law and Society
Monograph.
7lTrinidad and Tobago Constitution, 1962, Art. 1(j).
72The words in square brackets are not included in the Trinidad and Tobago
clause, but they appear in the Constitution of Jamaica - Art. 24(2). As to its
implications see the baffling majority judgment of the Jamaica Court of Appeal in
Byfield v Allen (1970) 16 WIR 1 where the Court held (Graham-Perkins, J.A.
dissenting) that the reason for which the plaintiff was refused employment as a
headmaster of a school situated in the defendant's (Minister of Education) Consti-
tuency was not the plaintiff's political opinion. Cf. the conclusion arrived at by
the Court of Appeal of the West Indies Associated States in Camacho & Sons
Ltd. v Collector of Customs (1971) 18 WIR 159 discussed in "Fundamental Human
Rights, the Courts and the West Indian Constitutions," supra.
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7 3The meaning of this expression vis-a-vis collective bargaining and the right
to strike was the subject for decision in Collymore v Attorney General of Trinidad
and Tobago (1967) 12 WIR 5 (T&T C.A.); (1969) 15 WIR 229 (P.C.); Banton
v Alcoa Minerals, Inc. (1971) 17 WIR 275, discussed supra.
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"Report of the Commission . . . to investigate Allegations of Discrimininatory





79 Henry, Op.cit., at p. 73. Cl. the somewhat ambivalent provision of Sec. 3(1)
of Part II of the First Schedule to the Bahamas Industrial Relations Act which
is to the effect that the qualifications for membership in a trade union shall in-
clude that no person shall be eligible for membership of the trade union unless he
is, or has been, regularly and normally employed in the industry, or as a member
of the craft or category of employees which the union represents. This is certainly
an innovation which is peculiarly different from the closed shop or union shop
practices for union membership is neither made a condition for obtaining employ-
ment nor is it a condition for remaining in a particular employment but the other
way round. A worker must first obtain employment before he can think of joining
a trade union. Furthermore, it would seem to follow that when he leaves one em-
ployment he has to relinquish his membership of the union for another union may
be based in the industry where he now finds new employment. It would seem too
that he is ineligible for membership for any period he remains unemployed. The
best that can be said of this provision is that the Act encourages "Industrial Union"
and "Craft Unions" see Sec. 2(1) of Part I of the First Schedule.
S0The proposed new Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago drafted by the high
powered Constitution Commission now provides that "every person shall have the
right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation trade or business":
(Art. 13(1)). Quaere whether this provision protects the individual's right to work
in a situation where he has the necessary qualifications for a particular job. Can
this article protect him if he is not offered the job on some discriminatory ground
and the employer is not a public authority and the person refusing him employment
is not "acting in the execution of public function." Cl. s.703(a) of the U.S. Civil
Rights Act of 1964 where the right to work is protected as against "any individual."
St lndustrial Relations Act, No. 14 of 1970. This Act protects the right of a
worker to join or take part in trade union business as against the employer in-
terfering with the exercise of that right, Sec. 42.
82No. 23 of 1972. As under the Bahamas Act, the individual worker has a
right as against his employer not to be dismissed for union membership under the
Trinidad and Tobago Act, see Secs. 42 and 75.
S3This Act is not intended to regulate union affairs but to provide for the
establishment of a permanent tribunal for purposes of settling labour disputes.
Sec. 4 protects the rights of the workers in respect of trade union membership.
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